Judge Doris Pryor cast the deciding vote in a 2-1 decision that reversed a lower court and ruled that two fired employees should have the opportunity to prove that the reason they refused to take a required COVID-19 shot was their religious objection, which would have made their firing a violation of federal civil rights law. The July 2024 decision was in Passarella v Aspirus, Inc.
What is the background of this case?
Megan Passarella worked as a nurse and Sandra Dottenwhy as a pharmacy tech at a Wisconsin hospital for Aspirus, Inc. The company required them and other employees to get COVID-19 vaccinations in order to keep their jobs, although religious exemptions were permitted. When Passarella and Dottenwhay applied for such an exemption, however, Aspirus determined that their objections were ‘more rooted in safety concerns than religious conviction,” and fired them for refusing to take the vaccinations.
Each of the two former employees sued Aspirus under Title VII for failing to accommodate what they claimed were religious objections. A district court, however, dismissed both cases as a matter of law, claiming that neither of them articulated “any religious belief” that would prevent them from taking the vaccines if they believed they were safe. They appealed the dismissal to the Seventh Circuit.
How did Judge Pryor and the Seventh Circuit Rule and Why is it Important?
Judge Pryor cast the deciding vote in a 2-1 opinion that reversed the district court and sent the case back so that the two former employees could have a chance to prove that at least part of their reason for refusing the COVID-19 vaccine was because of their religious beliefs. The majority explained, based on statutory language and relevant case law, that Title VII requires that an employee seeking a religious accommodation must “allege facts plausibly permitting” the conclusion that “some aspect” of the employee’s request is “based on the employee’s religious observance and practice or belief.”
Based on the record below, the court found that Passarella and Dottenwhy had met that standard. The majority specifically explained that an objection may have both religious and secular bases, but as long as it is based partly on religion, it qualifies, as several other courts have ruled. The court also noted that as the case goes forward, the employer will be able to try to show that the religious beliefs are not “sincere” or that it cannot “reasonably accommodate” the former employees’ beliefs without undue hardship to others. At this stage, however, Passarella and Dottenwhy should have the opportunity to prove their claims.
Judge Pryor’s deciding vote is obviously important to Megan Passarella and Sandra Dottenwhy in their effort to seek justice for the religious discrimination they contend they suffered. It also sets an important precedent for religious accommodation and discrimination cases, particularly in the Seventh Circuit, including Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. The ruling also provides an important example of the significance of promptly confirming fair-minded judges to our federal courts.